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Introduction
The intensified political campaign to strengthen the leadership of theCommunist Party of China (CCP) in recent years has spilled over intothe arena of corporate governance. As part of the campaign to pave
the way for the Constitutional Amendment in early 2018 to insert the CCP
leadership as the defining feature of socialism in China, (1) the Organisation
Department of the CCP and the State Council issued a circular dated 15
March 2017 ordering institutionalisation of the party’s leading functions in
all state owned enterprises (SOEs) at all levels by way of amendments to
their Articles of Association. In response to the call of the Party-state, all
lower governments set out deadlines for implementation, with the model
provisions to be included in the Articles of the companies under their su-
pervision. (2) As a result, about 90% of enterprises with government owner-
ship, including several dozen companies listed overseas, have completed
their amendments to formally provide Party organisations with the ultimate
power over decision-making and personnel appointment. (3)
The movement soon expanded beyond SOEs to domestic private and for-
eign investment enterprises, particularly those in new economic sectors, to
ensure ideological control and national security. The CCP has demanded
that the Articles of these firms include not only a declaration of loyalty, but
also an affirmation of the pivotal role of grassroots Party branches in deci-
sion-making and business operations. (4) In the latest move, the China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), as the securities market regulator,
in September 2018 published its revised Corporate Governance Principles
of Listed Companies to replace the 2002 version, including a specific provi-
sion that the Party’s activities be written into the Articles of state-controlled
companies. (5)
The recent developments have attracted a great deal of international at-
tention, with the expression of deep concern about China’s deviation from
the norms and principles of market economy (Allen and Rui 2018). Since
corporate governance has become increasingly important in controlling risk
in the light of globalised competition, certain norms and principles have
been widely accepted, such as the G20/OECD Corporate Governance Prin-
ciples as amended in 2015 (“OECD Principles”) and the OECD Guidelines
on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises of 2015 (“OECD
Guidelines”). Both the OECD Principles and the OECD Guidelines set out
their objectives “to support economic efficiency, sustainable growth and fi-
nancial stability” (OECD Principles 2015) and “to ensure positive contribu-
tion to economic efficiency and competitiveness.” Similarly, the ultimate
rationale for state ownership in SOEs is to maximise value for society
through an efficient allocation of resources subject to appropriate proce-
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ship in companies will negatively affect development of the market economy and rule of law as well as China’s attempt to create an innovative
society for its economic upgrading.
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dures of political accountability and transparency (OECD Guidelines 2015).
The Chinese government participated in formulating the OECD Principles
and OECD Guidelines. It committed to adopting the OECD Principles to all
publicly-listed companies. It also expressed the intention to utilise the OECD
Guidelines to improve corporate governance of its SOEs, particularly in
terms of the independence of SOEs from political influence (International
Trade Administration of US (ITA) 2017). In fact, China endorsed the 2015
revised G20/OECD Principles with President Xi Jinping’s participation in the
G20 Antakya Summit in November 2015 as his gesture of encouraging fur-
ther reform. (6)
Worldwide, corporate governance has been promoted as playing an im-
portant role in the development of rule of law and as a benchmark for good
governance since the late twentieth century (OECD Principles 2015). Ac-
cording to the World Bank, it has long been accepted that rule of law is an
indispensable foundation of market economy and requires a competitive
institution with transparency, accountability, checks and balances, and im-
partiality as its pillars to realise its full social and economic potential (The
World Bank 2017). Thus, the formal inclusion of the CCP political leadership
into corporate governance in China has sent out a very confusing signal and
has triggered serious debate amongst investors, practitioners, and scholars
on the direction of China’s future legal and economic reform. 
With these references in mind, this article critically examines this political
movement and its implications from the perspective of market economy
and development of rule of law. Part I briefly reviews SOE reform since the
late 1970s as a process of struggle; Part II highlights the intensified trend
to embed the CCP leadership into corporate governance in recent years;
Part III analyses the potential conflicts of the CCP leadership in corporate
governance with market discipline and company law; Part IV considers the
broader implications to China’s development of politicising corporate gov-
ernance; and Part VI makes some concluding remarks. 
A brief review of SOE reform since the
1970s
The reform of SOEs, a pillar of China’s socialism and planned economy,
has been a key part of the economic modernisation of China since the late
1970s. Reform experienced a long struggle, with parallel developments in
the maintenance of the CCP’s political control and ideology and the pro-
motion of market efficiency and discipline. 
The original theme of SOE reform in the 1980s was separation of the
Party’s political control from the business management of enterprises (zheng
qi fenkai 政企分开). For instance, a director responsibility system, in which
directors are the legal representatives of SOEs and lead the enterprises with
comprehensive and uniform responsibilities (changzhang jingli fuzezhi 厂长
经 理 负 责 制 ), was established and promoted by the Party-state in the
1980s. (7) Meanwhile the CCP adopted provisions to define the role of Party
organisations in SOEs as actively supporting the decision-making and man-
agement of the directors to ensure implementation of Party-state policies
under the general principle that the Party secretary should not hold the po-
sition of director. (8) The 13th National Congress of the CCP explicitly declared
that “the Party’s grassroots organisations in enterprises shall no longer prac-
tice unified leadership” (bu zai dui ben danwei shixing “yiyuanhua” lingdao
不再对本单位实行“一元化”领导). (9) These provisions were further codified
into the Law of Industrial Enterprises of the Whole People of 1988 in order
to provide the director responsibility system with “legal protection.” (10)
The Tiananmen Square Incident changed the course and environment of
SOE reform. In 1989, the CCP for the first time required Party organisations
within SOEs to be “the political core” in order to prevent “any new political
disturbance.” (11) This status was later written into the CCP Constitution in
1992 to enable its grassroots organisations in SOEs to participate in the
decision-making process for important matters. (12)
Soon after, another tidal shift was initiated by paramount leader Deng Xi-
aoping with the famous Constitutional Amendment in 1993 that officially
replaced the old planned economy with so-called socialist market econ-
omy. (13) The CCP then decided to reform the SOE-dominated regime with
a modern corporation system with clearly defined property rights and lia-
bilities, separation of business operations from politics, and scientific man-
agement (chanquan mingxi, quanze mingque, zheng qi fenkai, guanli kexue
产权明晰, 权责明确, 政企分开, 管理科学). (14) Meanwhile, the CCP adopted
its policy to adhere to the director responsibility system, (15) and made it
clear that the political core of Party organisations in SOEs should not lead
to the Party replacing enterprise management. (16) In this period, corporate
governance was first acknowledged by the CCP as the core of the modern
enterprise system for China’s economic modernisation. (17)
This round of reform produced a series of positive achievements, including
the adoption of the first Company Law and the first Securities Law in PRC
history in 1993 and 1998 respectively as the landmarks of introducing a
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modern enterprise system into China; accession to the World Trade Organ-
isations (WTO) in 2001 with a commitment to market disciplines in which
“the government would no longer directly administer the human, finance
and material resources, and operational activities such as production, supply
and marketing,” (WTO 2001); and the promulgation of China’s first set of
Corporate Governance Principles of Listed Companies in 2002, including
rules on protecting investors’ rights, fair dealing among majority and mi-
nority shareholders, and professional responsibilities. (18) These developments
not only provided significant momentum for the country’s economic tak-
ing-off, but also transformed most SOEs into market-oriented corporations.
According to the results of the Second National Economic Survey published
at the end of 2009, the number of SOEs dropped from 369,000 in 2001 to
143,000, and counted for less than 3% of China’s 4.96 million enterprises. (19)
However, the development of the socialist market economy has never pre-
vented the Party-state from “heavily intervening in a broad range of decisions
related to the strategies, management, and investments of state-owned en-
terprises,” particularly after the establishment of the State-Owned Assets Su-
pervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) as the Party-state agency
for SOE corporate governance in 2003 (United States Trade Representative
2015). The SASAC has thus far not only set out numerous regulations for the
operation and management of SOEs, but has also developed a very sophisti-
cated network to promote party-state ideology and policies from the central
to the local levels (Lin and Milhaupt 2013). Its working emphasis soon shifted
from improving SOE efficiency with diversified ownership in its early years
to repositioning the state sector with high market concentration to make it
bigger and stronger under the CCP’s so-called national champion strategy
emphasising national political security and economic safety. (20)
In this process, SOE market monopolies have been further enhanced with
consolidation of the gigantic SOEs under the direct control of the central
government, known as the central enterprises (yangqi 央企). In 2017, the
total assets and turnover of central enterprises reached RMB 55 trillion, a
73.8% increase over 2012, and RMB 26.4 trillion, or 33% of that year’s na-
tional GDP. Out of 97 central enterprises, 48 ranked in the World Top 500. (21)
Meanwhile, 1,003 state-controlled listed companies accounted for 44% of
the entire value of China’s securities market (Liao 2017), not to mention
the holdings of various investment funds under state control, known as “the
national teams” (guojiadui 国家队), accounting for another 7.4% of market
value. (22)
Political ideology is also reflected in major legislation. For example, the
2005 amendments to the Company Law further mandated that enterprises,
regardless of their ownership, must provide CCP grassroots organisations with
“necessary working conditions.” (23) Further, the Law on the State-Owned As-
sets of Enterprises of 2008 stipulates the SASAC’s function as a special in-
vestor in enterprises with state investment on behalf of the government at
all levels, including decision-making rights on important matters, manage-
ment selection, formulation of articles of association, and the legal obligation
to increase the value of state assets and prevent them from being lost. (24)
The repositioning of the state sector has also played out in the phe-
nomenon of “the state advances, the private sector retreats” (guo jin min
tui 国进民退), wherein SOEs have expanded their market monopoly by ag-
gressively taking over private businesses with their political power and unfair
terms (Yang and Jiang 2012; Johansson and Feng 2016). In this process, quite
a few private entrepreneurs were convicted of unlawfully raising capital,
competing with SOE-controlled sectors in violation of state policy, and al-
leged embezzlement of SOE assets. (25)
Such developments have not only extinguished the momentum of SOE
reform for more than 10 years, (26) but have also resurrected traditional SOE-
style governance. The CCP and the SASAC have demanded that Party or-
ganisations in SOEs maintain high consistency with the Party’s political
lines and actively explore means of participating in major decision-making
in SOEs by way of cross-linked positions of Party leaders and senior man-
agement. (27) In 2010, the CCP and the State Council further promoted a so-
called “three majors and one large” system (sanzhong yida 三重一大), in
which all major decision-making, major personnel appointments, the adop-
tion of major projects, and large capital operations of SOEs must be decided
with the participation of Party committees, with Party secretaries as the
principal responsible persons. (28)
The above brief review of SOE reform and the development of corpo-
rate governance in China as a socialist market economy since the late
1970s has provided a showcase of legal and ideological struggle in an
uncertain course charted by CCP policies. Despite some significant
progress, the CCP’s political control has never gone away. As such, reform
that has merely oscillated between market economy and political au-
thoritarianism has proved insufficient to effectively improve corporate
governance in China. Since 2003, with the Party-state’s support, the state
sector that survived reform and financial crisis has even made a dynamic
come-back with stagnation of the reform process. According to a joint
assessment by Protiviti and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in
2012 of the top 100 listed companies in China with OECD Corporate
Governance Principles, the average score was 65.9 out of 100, showing
a considerable gap with the norms and practices recommended by the
Principles, particularly in terms of shareholder rights protection, board
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function, and mechanisms to deal with conflict of interest. (29) This is the
background against which the new round of SOE reform was launched
after Xi Jinping took office. 
New movements in the Xi era
The struggles of SOE reform have continued under Xi Jinping’s leader-
ship. Some renewed endeavour toward reform was reflected in the CCP
Decision adopted in 2013 (“the Reform Decision”) to comprehensively
deepen reform by letting the market play a decisive role in resource allo-
cation. As far as SOE reform was concerned, the Decision clearly stated
that SOEs should be further reformed with a better definition of their
functions on the basis of market competition and protections of the prop-
erty rights of enterprises with different kinds of ownership. (30) A year later,
the CCP further adopted a decision to promote the rule of law for national
political and economic development. The Decision set out the goals of ef-
fectively protecting property and contract rights, and promoting equal
competition among companies with different ownership within a unified
market. (31)
The CCP decisions have produced some positive results, such as a further
amendment of the Company Law to abolish the minimum statutory capital
requirement in 2013, (32) and the promotion of mixed ownership to let SOEs
bow out of some competitive business sectors. (33) The State Council further
set out a mandatory time limit for all SOEs to complete their transforma-
tion, i.e., the end of 2017. (34) It was reported that approximately 97% of
central and local SOEs completed their incorporation work by January
2018. (35)
Despite the encouraging signs, it is not necessary to read between the
lines to find a continuation of inherent contradictions and conflicts between
political ideology and market disciplines in the new round of reform. In the
Reform Decision, apart from the call for further marketisation of SOEs,
heavy emphasis was placed on upholding socialism and the CCP’s leader-
ship. It was explicitly stated that the general purpose of the comprehensive
reforms was to develop socialism with Chinese characteristics and to fash-
ion Party-state governance. As such, all reform must be carried out under
the close embrace of CCP leadership as the political core to control the de-
sign and overall situation of reform. (36)
In fact, political campaigns to strengthen party leadership in enterprises
have been carried out at a higher intensity than market reforms in recent
years. Since 2013, at least a dozen Party-state documents have been issued
for this purpose, with heavy emphasis on firmly adhering to party leadership
in SOEs. For instance, the top CCP leadership group adopted the Opinions
on Adhering to CCP Leadership and Enhancing Its Construction in Deepening
SOE Reform (the Opinions) in June 2015, in which the CCP leadership was
characterised as the unique advantage of SOE competitiveness, and thus
adherence to it had to be built into the process of SOE reform. In particular,
the Opinions for the first time mandated the integration of the Party lead-
ership enhancement with corporate governance improvement through a
clear identification of the legal status (fading diwei 法定地位) of the Party
leadership, its control over SOE senior officers, and its more active role in
SOE operation. (37)
A circular issued by the Party-state in 2013 further specified that Party
organisations had to be involved in decision-making in important matters
of SOEs, including adopting development strategies, operational policy,
mergers and acquisitions, selection of mid-level management, and Party
control over personnel matters (dang guan ganbu/dang guan rencai 党管
干部/党管人才). It explicitly provided that Party committees should be con-
sulted on all important motions before they are submitted to the board of
directors. (38)
More detailed guidelines promulgated by the CCP and the State Council
in 2015 made it clear that the guiding ideology of SOE reform should be
upholding socialism to make SOEs stronger, better, and bigger, and main-
taining the controlling position of central enterprises in all the key business
fields that involve national security and economic lifelines. Moreover, the
Party-state demanded an innovation in the core political role it plays in
SOEs by introducing a cross-appointment system for Party leaders and di-
rector and senior officer positions (shuangxiang jinru, jiaocha renzhi, 双向
进入，交叉任职), and as a general principle the Party secretary shall be
appointed the chairman of the board of directors. As such, Party leaders
hold all key positions and decision-making power through “double (political
and management) responsibilities” (yi gang shuang ze 一岗双责) and “their
sense of political loyalty” (zhongcheng yishi 忠诚意识). (39) The mandates
were further endorsed by the State Council in 2017, when Party commit-
tees were ensured control of the direction, overall operation, and imple-
mentation of SOEs (bao fangxiang, guan daju, bao luoshi 保方向, 管大局,
保落实). (40) More recently, the campaign to institutionalise Party leadership
through amendments to the Articles further demonstrates the CCP’s long-
term political agenda. 
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Special feature
Integration of Party leadership with corporate governance was soon cel-
ebrated as a “significant institutional innovation” (41) for: (1) upgrading the
core role of Party organisations to overall leadership; (2) officially giving up
the reform theme of party-enterprise separation with further legitimation
of linking SOE management with the Party’s political lines; (3) further fixing
the Party’s status through mandated provisions of company Articles of As-
sociation; (4) officially mandating interlocked positions to ensure the party’s
decision-making control for the first time, and (5) vigorous expansion of
the political campaign to the private sector for the first time since the eco-
nomic reform in the late 1970s. As such, the direction of the longstanding
reform has been reversed, and “the prospects for enduring corporate gover-
nance reform in China appears gloomier than ever” (Song 2017).
Conflicting interests in corporate governance
The political campaign described above has sent out very confusing mes-
sages concerning the development of China’s socialist market economy. On
the one hand, China has accepted the OECD Principles and vigorously
fought for international recognition of its status as a full market econ-
omy. (42) On the other hand, the return of SOEs, with the Party leadership
as a core element of corporate governance, clearly demonstrates a signifi-
cant change in the prevailing theme of reform over the past three or four
decades, which was to separate party politics from SOE business manage-
ment. The conflicting developments further reflect the unique character of
corporate governance challenges in China.
In the first place, Party-state ideology and political considerations may
inevitably conflict with the OECD Principles of economic efficiency, sus-
tainable growth, and accountability. At the recent National Party Construc-
tion Conference of SOEs, Xi Jinping stated that Party leadership in SOEs
“aims at making them the most reliable force of the Party-state to firmly
implement its deployment” (Xi 2016). This political ideology is in apparent
conflict with market discipline and other shareholders’ interests. In reality,
this priority has been realised at the cost of market efficiency. According to
a recent study by the Unirule Institute of Economics (Tianze jingji yanjiu
suo 天则经济研究所), the average net assessed return of the entire state
sector in 2001-2013 was 9.08%, much lower than that of the non-state
sector, which was 15.67%; and state financial subsidies to SOEs in 1994-
2007 amounted to RMB 639.4 billion (Unirule Institute of Economics 2016).
Even some huge central SOEs that monopolised the market had to rely on
heavy government subsidies to make up for their losses. (43)
Secondly, the enhancement of Party leadership in SOEs may have a neg-
ative impact on market transparency and equal competition. The Party-
state’s policy of making SOEs better, bigger, and stronger may adversely
affect the competitive environment for other market players. Since SOEs
marched back to the market in the early 2000s, three phenomena have
been observed: (1) private sector investment has declined from an average
of 20% in the 2000s to just 1.2% in July 2016; (44) (2) in the past 15 years,
Chinese investment emigration, mainly by rich entrepreneurs, has grown
dramatically. Nearly two-thirds of wealthy entrepreneurs with assets of
more than 1.5 million of US dollar surveyed by Hurun Research Institute in
2014 had either already participated in investor visa programs or were con-
sidering their migration plans (Tian 2017); and (3) mixed ownership pro-
grams have attracted limited interest from the private sector due to serious
worries about political control and the lack of a level playing field. (45) In a
sense, these phenomena can be viewed as votes of insecurity and noncon-
fidence in the current regime and policy. Moreover, there have been warn-
ings that because of ideological struggle, mixed ownership schemes cannot
effectively resolve the corporate governance problems of SOEs (Milhaupt
and Zheng 2016), particularly when they are intended “to rationalise the
state sector position and reinforce the state sector’s capacity for control,
market influence, and risk resistance.” (46)
Thirdly, the mandatory amendment of the Articles of Associations of cor-
porations to stipulate Party leadership will trigger deep concerns over the
protection of minority shareholders in both Party-state-controlled firms
and other companies where the Party organisation may play a role dispro-
portionate to their interest percentage. Quite a few Chinese companies
listed in Hong Kong have seen strong resistance to such article amend-
ments, with more than 10% voting against the proposals concerned. For
example, almost 39% of shares issued in Hong Kong (H shares) represented
at the general meeting of the Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC), the
largest bank in the world, voted against the change. In the case of Chongqing
Iron & Steel, the opposing votes of H shares in the general meeting ex-
ceeded 70%. Such strong opposition has even forced some companies to
be listed overseas without sufficient state controlled shares to suspend their
amendments in order to avoid defeat (Allen and Rui 2018). In a surprising
incident, the minority shareholders of Tianjin Real Estate Group (Tianfang
jituan 天房集团), a Shanghai listed company where the single SOE majority
shareholder controlled 26.74% of the total shares, voted down the proposal
to insert Party leadership into the company’s Articles of Association in its
general meeting in January 2017. The study revealed that 91% of the re-
maining small shareholders with holdings of less than 5% voted against the
proposal, which clearly showed the degree of their antagonism (since ab-
staining from the vote would lead to the same result). (47)
This rebellion of the company was eventually dealt with by another gen-
eral meeting in May 2017, during which the board of directors called for
the collection of proxy votes in advance. According to Article 31 of the Gen-
eral Meeting Rules of Listed Companies in China, a shareholder with an in-
terest in the proposed matter should recuse him/herself from voting;
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sufficient disclosure of information should be made to the shareholders
concerned; and minority votes should be counted separately if the matter
may significantly affect their interest. (48) Nevertheless, the board’s proxy
call simply stated that setting out the Party’s legal status as part of corpo-
rate governance in its Articles was a reflection of the company’s lawful op-
eration and enabled the Party to play its core role. (49) As a result, the Party
committee not only ensured the board of directors’ passage of the Article
amendment empowering it to review all important matters before they are
submitted to the board, but also realised “comprehensive” Party leadership
of all levels of the company within just five months. (50)
Fourthly, integration of the Party leadership with corporate governance may
further complicate the already overloaded legal framework and its rational
function. The corporate governance structure in China has long been criticised
for its over-complexity, with not only a German-style supervisory board, US-
invented independent directors, former Soviet Union-style workers’ assembly,
British-type taking-over rules, and Chinese Party-state establishments (Zhang
2012), but also discordant relations between the board of directors, supervi-
sory board, and shareholders meeting under the new formal governance struc-
ture (xinsanhui 新三会), standing side-by-side with the Party committee,
trade union, and workers’ assembly under the old SOE framework (laosanhui
老三会) (Gore 2011). Thus far the system has not functioned well due to in-
ternal conflicts, guanxi (关系)-based culture, and political intervention. 
In this environment, strengthening the Party leadership in enterprises may
further subject the chairman and the board to divided Party and fiduciary
loyalties, and divided professional standards toward their companies and
shareholders. Moreover, Party participation might further intensify existing
institutional conflicts. For example, as part of the effort to improve corpo-
rate governance, the State Council has mandated SOEs to fully establish a
board system with outsider directors as the majority.(51) However, minority
insider directors, who are cross-appointed from the Party committees, will
definitely have more control and decision-making power to ensure the cor-
rect political line of the Party-state as their top priority, as opposed to out-
side directors, who are legally supposed to play a role independent from the
majority shareholders and serve as de facto controllers to protect the in-
terests of the company, both as a whole and of the minority shareholders. (52)
In this regard, a wave of resignations was observed recently: at least 134
independent directors left their positions in the second half of 2016, citing
institutional restrictions on the exercise of their independent power as the
major reason. (53) As such, it is by no means certain to what extent the in-
terests of the Party-state shareholders and other (minority) shareholders
can be truly and fairly united. The board may not actually represent and
protect the interest of all shareholders, while the supervisory board, as
watchdog of the company, may effectively supervise the Party committee’s
exercise of power over the company. 
Fifthly, the strong Party presence in enterprises may add challenges and
difficulties to the accountability and enforcement of corporate governance.
According to the policies and provisions mentioned above, a company board
under Party leadership is required, in performing its duties, to first adhere
to the Party-state before considering business principles, including due dili-
gence and prudence. This apparently goes beyond the power and jurisdiction
of enforcement agencies. As such, laws and regulations may not be strictly
enforced with a full accounting of liabilities if certain decisions or activities
are directed by Party committees for any political purpose.
Moreover, such party-enterprise relations may have a fenced-off effect
against strict enforcement. Thus far, on market enforcement, SOEs still enjoy
special privileges, particularly with respect to market discipline and legal li-
abilities. For instance, for a long time bankruptcy law in China could not be
effectively implemented due to the political protection of SOEs and the
priority placed on maintaining social stability (Wei 2017). Studies also find
that state-controlled companies received fewer sanctions on securities mar-
ket enforcement than private firms due to their relations with the party-
state and various political considerations (Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2011). In
this context, the Party’s strong leadership may further complicate the en-
forcement and disrupt equal competition in the market.
Last but not least, expansion of Party leadership to private enterprises has
raised serious concerns and controversy. According to the CCP, in addition
to SOEs, the campaign to enhance Party leadership has also marched into
the private sector. By the end of 2016, Party organisations had been estab-
lished in 67.8% of 2.73 million domestic private enterprises and 70% of
106,000 foreign investment enterprises. Due to the state mandate, Party
establishment and leadership have virtually become a condition of market
access to China for foreign investment firms over and above the Company
Law and OECD Principles. (54) It is the CCP that writes itself into corporate
governance through its internal provisions rather than any clear legal rules.
Article 2 of the Working Provisions of CCP Organisations explicitly empow-
ers CCP establishments to play a “core leading role” in, inter alia, all eco-
nomic organisations, regardless of their ownership. (55)
This political campaign has met with strong resistance in the private sec-
tor. In addition to domestic incidents such as shareholders’ refusal and en-
trepreneurs’ lack of confidence, as reflected above, the Delegations of
German Industry and Commerce in China stated that German investment
enterprises in China might “retreat from the Chinese market or reconsider
investment strategies” if such attempts continued. (56) The EU Chamber of
Commerce in China also demanded that foreign investment enterprises be
treated differently from SOEs, and argued that the corporate governance
established by the Company Law and joint venture laws of China, giving the
board of directors the highest executive authority, should not be changed
in such a dramatic way. (57)
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Special feature
A critical examination shows that enhancement of Party leadership has
not only reversed the direction of SOE reform, but has also had a negative
impact on the entire market with respect to improving corporate gover-
nance, market efficiency, strict enforcement and accountability, fiduciary
duty to avoid conflict of interest, and effective protection of the interests
of shareholders as a whole in compliance with OECD Principles.
Further implications
The integration of Party leadership with corporate governance is not an
isolated movement, but an important part of the recent political campaign
to enhance the CCP’s overall leading position in the entire country, together
with the constitutional amendment to confirm the Party leadership as the
most fundamental element of Chinese socialism, and the departure from
Deng Xiaoping’s original advocacy of separating the Party from the state
and the market. (58)
Given that China has been a socialist country for almost 70 years, since
1949, the path dependence theory may not view this political development
as a big surprise. What is interesting is the reorientation of the attack toward
some major achievements of the reform. Since 1993, when the principle of
socialist market economy was written into the Constitution, the Party-state
has vigorously promoted the establishment of a modern enterprise system
as an effective means of SOE reform, and has carefully tried to balance cor-
porate governance rules with the Party’s political ideology, despite its wari-
ness of the market and civil society institutions (Clarke 2010). As observed
by the Asian Corporate Governance Association, from the early 1990s, “[t]he
dominant corporate governance reform trend in China was towards global
standards,” with the government’s avid participation in international devel-
opments until the attitude change after the worldwide financial crisis (Allen
and Rui 2018). After Xi Jinping delivered his speech at the 2016 National
Party Construction of SOEs, directing heavy criticism at the weakening, fad-
ing, and marginalisation of Party leadership in SOEs, the trend has appar-
ently been reversed. Some official media articles have openly claimed that,
in the first 30 years of SOE reform, Party leadership was damaged in the
process of learning the modern enterprises system, with the Western cor-
porate governance structure damaging SOE development. (59) In this context,
rights-based corporate governance is viewed more as a threat to the polit-
ical regime than as enabling institutions. Recently, the official journal of the
Communist Party even published an article stating that eliminating private
ownership should never be forgotten as the mission of the Communist Party,
despite allowing for mixed ownership during the transitional period. (60)
The economic reform of the past 40 years has significantly changed China
as well as the Communist Party. Despite the economic achievements, the
Party-state has remained wary of the political implications of market de-
mands for efficient competition, diversified ownership, and market freedom
and equality. In a sense, the Party’s concern is justified when it observes
how market forces have weakened and diminished the organisational
monopoly, extensive embeddedness in society, and functional rule at the
micro-level that it has enjoyed since 1949 (Gore 2011).
Against this backdrop, it may not be too difficult to understand Xi Jinping’s
characterisation of SOEs as “the important material and political foundation”
of China’s socialism and the Party’s leadership as the “roots and soul” of SOEs
to make them the most reliable force of the party-state. As a result, any weak-
ening, fading, blurring, or isolation of the Party’s role in SOEs has to be dealt
with comprehensively (Xi 2016). Thus, “the first and foremost reason” for the
Party-state to reset party-enterprise relations with its overall and visible con-
trol in enterprises (Wang 2014: 660) is to prevent the encroachment of the
market economy, even if this is apparently contradictory to the objectives of
the OECD Principles and corporate law under market discipline to advance
the aggregate welfare of all stakeholders affected by the companies’ activities
with higher conflict-response efficiency, inter alia, between management and
shareholders, as well as between controlling and non-controlling shareholders
(Armour, Hansmann, Kraakman and Pargendler 2017). Thus, the principle of
Party leadership may inevitably assign much greater weight to safeguarding
the Party-state’s interests than to the principle of corporate governance, and
this can lead to more conflict and contradiction between China’s socialism
and its market economy (Brown 2012). (61)
Given the positive correlation between corporate governance and rule of
law, the movement to make Party leadership the core of corporate gover-
nance also reflects the current condition of rule of law in China. Recent
comprehensive research by the World Bank found that when a country’s
overall rule-based corporate governance and rights protection are weak,
voluntary and market corporate governance mechanisms have limited ef-
fectiveness (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2012). In this regard, it should be noted
that the Company Law of China sets out clear rules to empower employee
representatives and trade unions to participate in corporate governance, in-
cluding scope, seat guarantee, and working procedures. (62) In contrast, Article
19 of the Company Law merely permits Party organisations to exist without
any detailed stipulation. It is the Party itself that claims and institutionalises
its functions and leading role in corporate governance based on its political
power. As a result, rule-based governance may have to give way to a less
balanced and transparent exercise of political power. Moreover, given the
existing environment, any provision concerning the Party organisation may
only be implemented and enforced on a one-way street, as Article 19 of
the Company Law may only be used to justify the legal status, activities,
and resources taken by the Party organisations in companies. It cannot be
invoked in legal proceedings as a weapon for the companies and their share-
holders to challenge the Party’s demands as made at the cost of business
efficiency and return on shareholder investment. 
This relationship was explained by the CCP in its Decision for rule of law
promotion as “Letting Party leadership penetrate the entire process and all
aspects of ruling the country by law is a basic experience in the construction
of our country’s socialist rule of law. (…) Persisting in Party leadership is a
basic requirement for socialist rule of law. (…) Party leadership and socialist
rule of law are identical; socialist rule of law must persist in Party leadership,
and Party leadership must rely on socialist rule of law.” (63) Evidently, the CCP
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leadership has been deviating from the pragmatic approach of the early years
of reform, and has increasingly reinvigorated Leninist-style governance with
a highly instrumentalist attitude towards rule of law (DeLisle 2017: 79).
In spite of totalitarian ideology, the reality after 40 years of reform will
impose restrictions on the Party’s exercise of power. A dilemma facing the
Party-state at this moment is that: on the one hand it has to maintain the
momentum of China’s economic development as a crucial support for its
legitimacy and stability against the “new normal” (xin changtai 新常态) of
the market slowdown, where SOEs have long been out-performed by en-
terprises in the non-public sector; while on the other hand, it has to main-
tain its control and the monopoly of SOEs for political reasons at the cost
of market efficiency. For instance, Xi Jinping once stated that the criteria
for measuring the success of SOE reform should be the value increase in
state capital, improvement of the state sector’s competitiveness, and ex-
pansion of state capital control; (64) but at the same time he emphasised
Party leadership as “the root and soul” of SOEs (Xi 2016). Apparently,  the
tested wisdom will pose serious challenges to the party-state for its ap-
proach of burning the candle at both ends. 
With respect to corporate governance as an important part of a country’s
institutional competitiveness, there is an interesting debate over the Party-
state’s control in China. Although some commentators have strongly opposed
the party’s deeper involvement in SOE governance as moving in the wrong
direction, (65) Xi Jinping firmly believes that the Party leadership is the unique
advantage of SOEs (ibid.). In supporting this claim, Professor Jiang Daxing of
Peking University further argues that political connections are a phenomenon
not only in China, but worldwide, and that such connections are the result of
the state’s civilised exercise of power to participate in resource allocation with
both economic and legal legitimacy (Jiang 2018). He quotes an American
scholar, Mara Faccio, to support his view, although the quoted article, which
was based on a survey of enterprises in 47 countries, explicitly concluded that
“[political] connections are particularly common in countries with higher levels
of corruption, countries imposing restrictions on foreign investment. (…) Con-
nections are less common in countries with regulations that set more rigorous
limits on political conflicts of interest” (Faccio 2006: 384). 
Indeed, some recent surveys have found the rise of state capitalism in
many developing countries as an alternative path to the so-called Wash-
ington Consensus, with more state intervention, SOE growth, and national
champion policies, especially after the worldwide financial crisis in 2008
(Fraser Institute of Canada 2016; The Heritage Foundation 2018). In that
sense, what has happened in China is not just a return to the old politics
and planned economy, but a style of governance adapted to Western mar-
kets and legal institutions and a highly sophisticated strategy to challenge
Western leadership in the process of global competition. In other words,
the Party-state’s distrust of Western corporate governance concepts has
led to an upsurge in attempts to find its own answers based on its political
path (Allen and Rui 2018). In a larger context, the rise of state capitalism
worldwide has also triggered concerns over the stagnation of reform, dete-
rioration of political conditions, repression of market freedom, and negative
impact on innovation and protection of private rights (Kurlantzick 2016). 
The recent development, however, does call for further research. China,
as one of a very few socialist countries with Leninist ideology and with 70
years of communist rule, has made its experience and characteristics unique
and complex as compared with other developing countries. Against this
backdrop, traditional agency theory, with its focus on conflict of interest
between shareholders and management with a contractual nexus, may be
too narrow to effectively define the Party’s leading role in enterprises (Berle
and Means 1967). On the other hand, the more prominent stakeholder the-
ory, with the inclusion of representatives of social and natural systems into
corporate governance (Mitroff 1983; Friedman and Miles 2002), may not
be able to fully explain the superior position of the Party as a crucial stake-
holder in China’s socialist market economy. As such, although a large num-
ber of empirical studies on China’s corporate governance have been
conducted, a comprehensive understanding and consensus seems lacking,
and further investigations are still needed, particularly on the control mech-
anism in SOEs as hybrid business entities (Daiser 2016). However, globalised
competition and China’s ambition to be a leader of trade liberalisation have
left the Party-state with much less choice. The issue then seems to boil
down to the compatibility of market economy discipline, as reflected in the
OECD Principles, with political authoritarianism. The first 30 years of reform
tried to make an acceptable compromise in which both the Party-state and
market mechanisms had to go through institutional adaptations. The course
reversal of the past decade, however, has apparently promoted a new bal-
ance in favour of the Party’s political rule by reclaiming a considerable por-
tion of the concessions yielded. Such attempts to use political authority to
control “the spontaneous extended human order created by a competitive
market” (Hayek 1988) may eventually result in frustration of the Party-
state’s ambition to upgrade its economic structure in worldwide competi-
tion due to the constraints of the old path, which caused China to miss its
industrial revolution in the last century (Mokyr 2017).
Conclusion
Since the late 1970s, the Party-state, while vigorously promoting economic
and SOE reform, has never ceased to wrestle market institutions with its po-
litical powers. The unprecedented intensity of the recent Party leadership
campaign in SOEs and other enterprises has brought potential conflict and
negative impact, as well as a great deal of uncertainty, to the corporate gov-
ernance system. This may further affect the long-term development of mar-
ket sustainability and rule of law in China. At this moment, although it is not
completely clear whether the campaign is just a repeat of the “one step for-
ward, two steps back” cycle that has occurred many times in the past 40
years, or the emergence of a new model or approach to institutionalise
party-state leadership against market impingement, some problems seem
inevitable due to its lack of compliance with the OECD Principles and will
surface as this political institutionalisation is fully played out. As a result, fur-
ther research will be needed to better understand and assess the institutional
implications of Party leadership on the market and enterprises.
z Xianchu Zhang is Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law, University
of Hong Kong (xczhang@hku.hk). 
Manuscript received on 22 June 2018. Accepted on 18 January 2019.
62 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1
64. “习近平‘三个有利于‘标准是国企改革之魂” (Xi Jinping “san ge youliyu” biaozhun shi guoqi gaige
zhi hun, Xi Jinping’s “Three Benefits” Criteria are the soul of SOE reform), Zhongguo Jingji Wang
(中 国 经 济 网 , China Economic News), 3 August 2015, http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/
201508/03/t20150803_6114282.shtml (accessed on 9 April 2018). 
65. Sheng Hong, “我为什么不认同这次国企改革” (Wo wei shenme bu rentong zhe ci guoqi gaige,
Why I do not support this round of SOE reform), Zhongpingwang (中评网 Comments Net of
China), 12 August 2016, http://cj.sina.com.cn/article/detail/2381596945/43518 (accessed on 17
May 2018); Cai Yong-Wei, “国企改革将开倒车？” (Guoqi gaige jiangkai daoche? Will SOE reform
be turned back?), Zaobao (早报 Morning Newspaper Singapore), 9 June 2016, https://www.za-
obao.com/forum/zaodian/bei-jing-yi-ye/story20160609-626782 (accessed on 1 June 2018).
Special feature
N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 63
Xianchu Zhang – Integration of CCP Leadership with Corporate Governance
References
ALLEN, Jamie, and Rui LI. 2018. “Awakening Governance – The Evolution
of Corporate Governance in China (ACGA China CG Report 2018).” Asian
Corporate Governance Association, Hong Kong. 
ARMOUR, John, Henry HANSMANN, Reinier R. KRAAKMAN, and PAR-
GENDLER, Mariana. 2017 (3rd ed.). “What Is Corporate Law?” In R. Kraak-
man et al. (eds.), An Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1.
BERKMAN, Henk, Rebel COLE, and Lawrence FU. 2011. “Political Connec-
tion and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Mar-
ket Regulation in China.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
45: 1391-417. 
BERLE, Adolf Jr., and Gardiner MEANS. 1967 (2nd ed.). The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property: Transaction Books. New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World.
BROWN, Kerry. 2012. “The Communist Party of China and Ideology.”
China: An International Journal 10(2): 52-68.
CLAESSENS, Stjin, and Burcin YURTOGLU. 2012 Corporate Governance
and Development: An Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
CLARKE, Donald C. 2010. “Law without Order in Chinese Corporate Gov-
ernance Institutions.” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Busi-
ness 30(1): 131-99.
DAISER, Peter. 2016. “Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises:
A Systematic Analysis of Empirical Literature.” International Journal of
Public Sector Management 30(5): 447-66.
DELISLE, Jacques. 2017. “Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality, Develop-
mentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping.” Journal of Contemporary China
26(103): 68-84. 
FACCIO, Mara. 2006. “Politically Connected Firms.” The American Eco-
nomic Review 96(1): 369-86. 
Fraser Institute of Canada. 2016. “Economic Freedom of the World: 2016
Annual Report.” https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/eco-
nomic-freedom-of-the-world-2016.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2018).
FRIENDMAN, Andrew L., and Samantha MILES. 2002. Stakeholders, Theory
and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
GORE, Lance L. 2011. The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capital
Revolution: The Political Impacts of the Market. London: Routledge.
HAYEK, Friedrich A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Heritage Foundation. 2018. “2018 Index of Economic Freedom.”
https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2018/book/index_2018.pdf (ac-
cessed on 12 May 2018). 
International Trade Administration of US (ITA). 2017. “China Country Com-
mercial Guide: State Owned Enterprises.” https://www.export.gov/
article?id=China-State-Owned-Enterprises (accessed on 13 September
2018).
JENSEN, Michael C., and William H. MECKLING. 1976. “Theory of Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of
Financial Economics 3(4): 305-50.
JIANG, Daxing 蒋大兴. 2018. “政治/政党与企业 – 政治权利参与资源分配
的文明结构” (Zhengzhi/zhengdang yu qiye – zhengzhi quanli canyu ziyuan
fenpei de wenming jiegou, Politics/political party and enterprises: A civi-
lized structure for participation of political powers into resource alloca-
tion). Dangdai Faxue (Contemporary Law Review) 1: 11-31.
JOHANSSON, Anders, and Xunan FENG. 2016. “The State Advances, the
Private Sector Retreats? Firm Effects of China’s Great Stimulus Pro-
gramme.” Cambridge Journal of Economic 40(6): 1635-68.
KURLANTZICK, Joshua. 2016. State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism
Is Transforming the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
LIAO, Wenjing 廖文静. 2017. “国有控股上市公司治理结构研究” (Guoyou
konggu shangshi gongsi zhili jiegou yanjiu, A corporate governance study
of listed companies with state controlling holdings). Qiye yu Gaige (En-
terprise and Reform) 11: 4-5.
LIN, Li-Wen, and Curtis J. MILHAUPT. 2013. “We Are the (National) Cham-
pions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China.” Stan-
ford Law Review 65(1): 697-759. 
MILHAUPT, Curties L., and Wentong ZHENG. 2016. “Why Mixed-Owner-
ship Reforms Cannot Fix China’s State Sector.” Paulson Institution Policy
Memorandum. http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/
2017/01/PPM_SOE-Ownership_Milhaupt-and-Zheng_English_R.pdf (ac-
cessed on 23 May 2018).
MITROFF, Ian. 1983. Stakeholders of the Organizational Mind. San Fran-
cisco: Jossey-Bass.
MOKYR, Joel. 2017. A Cultural of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Econ-
omy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
OECD. 2015. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD.
OECD. 2015. OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned
Enterprises (2015 ed.). Paris: OECD.
SONG, Houze. 2017. “State-Owned Enterprise Reforms: Untangling Own-
ership, Control, and Corporate Governance.” Paulson Institute.
http://macropolo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/State-Owned-Enter-
prise-Reforms.pdf (accessed on 23 February 2018).
TIAN, Fangmeng. 2017. “Millionaire Emigration: The Allure of Investor Visas
among China’s Elite.” Migration Policy Institute, 20 September 2017.
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/millionaire-emigration-allure-in-
vestor-visas-among-chinas-elite (accessed on 5 April 2018). 
Unirule Institute of Economics. 2016. “国有企业的性质、表现与改革”
(Guoyou qiye de xingzhi, biaoxian yu gaige, The nature, performance and
reform of SOEs) http://unirule.cloud/index.php?c=article&id=4017 (ac-
cessed on 24 December 2017). United States Trade Representative. 2015
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.
WANG, Jiangyu. 2014. “The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in
China’s State-Owned Enterprises.” Cornell International Law Journal 47(3):
632-64. 
The World Bank. 2017. Governance and the Law (World Development Re-
port 2017). The World Bank. 83-4.
The World Trade Organization (WTO). 2001. Report of the WTO Working
Party on the Accession of China. WT/ACC/CHN/49.
WEI, Chuyi. 2017. “Bailouts and Bankruptcy Law in China: A Confusion of
Law and Policy.” Cambridge Journal of China Studies 12(4): 50-75. 
XI, Jinping 习近平. 2016. “坚持党对国有企业的领导不动摇” (Jianchi dan-
gdui guoyou qiye de lingdao budongyao, Unswervingly adhering to the
party leadership in SOEs). Renmin Ribao (人民日报 People’s Daily), 12 Oc-
tober 2016.
YANG, Dali, and Junyan JIANG. 2012. “Guojin Mintui: The Global Recession
and changing State-Economy Relations in China.” In Dali L. Yang (eds.),
The Global Recession and China’s Political Economy. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan.
ZHANG, Xianchu. 2012. “Company Law Reform in China.” In John Garrick
(ed.), Law and Policy for China’s Market Socialism. New York: Routledge.
Chapter 2.
